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ABSTRACT
Adoption of new technologies and a push for money-saving value engineering designs may produce unpredictable and unwanted
results. Particularly with shrinking budgets, proposals that reduce initial costs become more appealing. However, without careful
consideration and implementation, cost-reducing measures can become more expensive in the end.
This paper presents a case study of geostructural forensic analysis related to the failure of a helical anchor tie-down system selected to
support an Olympic size swimming pool against hydrostatic uplift forces. The selection of helical anchors over a more expensive
traditional anchorage system appeared to be a smart value engineering decision for the project’s design-build construction team.
However, structural failure occurred soon after construction. A review of design and construction documents revealed a myriad of
mistakes leading to the failure and very costly repair of the pool’s bottom slab. The demolition and consequent restoration of the slab
triggered the forensic study.
The geostructural forensic analysis initially focused on the tension capacity of the anchorage system. However, review of design data
indicated several critical mistakes at the anchor-to-concrete slab connections. Moreover, issues with final installation elevation, which
were overlooked in the original design and construction, necessitated the need for field modification of the connection. A step-by-step
summary of the forensic analysis of the tie-down support system failure is presented herein.

INTRODUCTION
Any structure constructed below the water table must be able
to successfully resist buoyant forces in order to remain in
place. Swimming pool structures constructed wholly or
partially below the water table are subjected to hydrostatic
uplift when the weight of the pool water plus the dead load of
the pool structure is less than the weight of the volume of
groundwater displaced by the pool. Moreover, the design
should also consider the case when the swimming pool is
empty, which can be the governing case in situations
involving uplift forces. An anchorage system is required to
keep these structures in place.
There has been growing interest in helical pile and helical
anchor applications in the United States since 1980’s. The
increasing popularity is dictated to a certain degree by a better
familiarity and confidence in this relatively new technology
within the construction community. It is also driven by
economics.
The cost for installing helical anchors is
substantially lower than traditional driven or drilled piles. As
a result, the number of complex structures supported by
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helical piles is constantly rising. The majority of these
projects employing helical piles provide big savings.
Nevertheless, failures do occur. This case study shows an
example of a helical support system failure that was caused by
both design and construction mistakes.

BACKGROUND
The swimming pool that is the subject of this paper was
constructed in an area having a high groundwater table.
According to the geotechnical report, the groundwater has a
static level of about 1.5 m (5 ft) below existing grades. The
report also indicates that the water level may fluctuate
seasonally by up to 1.2 m (4 ft). Consequently, a dewatering
system was needed during construction to temporarily
drawdown the groundwater level so that the work could be
performed “in the dry”. Moreover, normal groundwater
conditions necessitated that the pool design include provisions
for an appropriate anchorage system to enable it to resist
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hydrostatic uplift (buoyant) forces during its service life. The
anchorage system selected for this purpose utilized helical
steel piles in a rectangular grid pattern, whereby, piles were
connected to a steel anchorage assembly that was cast-in to the
bottom slab of the pool. Helical anchors were oriented in an
orthogonal grid spaced at roughly 2.74 m (9 ft) on-center over
an area approximately 50 m (164 ft) by 25 m (82 ft) in plan.
A total of 208 anchors were installed to resist the uplift force,
see Fig. 1 for pile layouts.

The uplift load acting on the bottom of the pool slab follows a
simple load path. When functioning correctly, uplift forces
are transferred from the concrete slab through a structural
connection to anchors and then safely into the supporting
ground. Even if anchors have sufficient capacity to resist
uplift forces, the slab can still ultimately fail if at least one of
the elements making up the force transferring connection
system between the slab and anchors fails or if the slab is not
adequately designed to bridge between anchor supports.

Subsurface Conditions

Fig. 1. Swimming Pool’s Anchorage Layout.

Cast-in-place reinforced concrete construction was used for
the walls and floor of the pool. The pool was designed as a
liquid retaining structure with an 18 inch thick cast-in-place
concrete bottom slab, doubly reinforced with #5 deformed
reinforcing bars spaced at 12 inches on-center in both
directions.
Pool walls were designed as cast-in-place
cantilevered retaining walls.
After placement of concrete walls and the bottom slab,
temporary dewatering wells were turned off while
construction continued with the pool being empty. The
bottom slab of the pool was noticed to rise approximately
three months after the dewatering system had been turned off
and decommissioned. The bulge was measured to be about 15
inches along the central portion of the pool. This failure was
sudden, without any apparent prior signs of distress. The
decision was made to partially fill the pool with water to
counteract the buoyant force, which allowed the slab to drop
more than half the distance toward its original position.

A subsurface investigation including soil borings, cone
penetrometer testing (CPT), and laboratory analyses were
conducted by a local geotechnical firm for the design of the
pool facility. Soil borings indicated relatively uniform soil
conditions at the site.
The pool area is underlain
predominantly by marine deposits consisting of fine and
medium poorly graded sand (SP), interlayered with silty sand
(SM) and occasional lenses of silt (ML) and clay (CL). The
subgrade soils are generally loose to medium density with
standard penetration test (SPT) values ranging between single
digits to low teens at the upper 15 to 20 feet below the bottom
of the pool. There is a distinct increase in blow counts, with N
values over 40, directly below the loose and soft upper layer.
The CPT sounding results, presented in Fig. 2, correlate well
with soil boring data.

Bottom Slab

Fig. 2. CPT Sounding Results – Horizontal Red Line
Indicates Bottom of Pool’s Slab.

DESIGN AND INSTALLATION CONSIDERATIONS
Individual anchors in the interior region of the pool slab must
resist large uplift forces. As a minimum, the interior anchors
used for the pool could be designed for the hydrostatic uplift
forces acting on the tributary area of a single anchor. In
general, the net hydrostatic uplift force is equal to the buoyant
force minus the weight of the pool slab.
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Based on the field and laboratory test results, the geotechnical
engineer recommended 12-inch square pre-cast concrete piles
for the pool’s wall and slab support. Pile embedment was
anticipated at about 35 to 40 feet below existing grades in
order to develop required pile capacity. The predicted
allowable capacity in compression and in tension was 50 tons
and 8 tons, respectively.
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Helical Anchors Design
The helical anchors used on the project were manufactured by
Hubbell Power Systems/Chance Civil Construction. The type
of helical anchor used was model SS5, consisting of a 1-½
inches square solid steel rod with three attached helix plates 8,
10, and 12 inches in diameter. Three different pile lengths
(28, 32, and 36 ft) and helix configurations were considered
for the pool anchorage system based on the location and soil
boring data. The selected system was designed for an
allowable tensile capacity of 27 kips. Catalog information for
this model of helical anchor indicates maximum ultimate
tensile capacity of 55 kips. Design compressive and tensile
resistance for this device is based on theoretical and empirical
methods and checked in the field by installation criteria and
limited pull-out tests on selected piles.
The anchorage system used also depended on the connection
between the helical anchor and the pool bottom slab to transfer
uplift forces from the slab to the helical anchors. The anchor
cap assembly consists of a pipe sleeve and steel cap plate that
are fitted loosely over and connected to the square shaft of the
helical anchor. After being assembled and attached to the
helical anchor, it is embedded (cast) into the pool slab. Pipe
sleeves used on this project were originally designed to be
connected to the helical anchor shaft using a bolted pinconnection, as shown in Fig. 3. This pile cap connection has
been rated in the catalog for a maximum tensile capacity of 20
kips.

length varied between 22 to 32 feet. All of the installed
anchors met the driving criteria defined as 5,500 ft-lb of
torque, or the manufacturer defined maximum twist of the
steel rod. A verification load test was performed on five
anchors. One of the tested anchors failed the 200% working
load test acceptance criteria.

Fig. 4. Field Modified Anchor Cap Where Helical Shaft Has
Been Inserted Through a Hole in the Cap Plate and Welded.

FIELD INVESTIGATION
Damage to the bottom slab of the pool necessitated its
replacement, which allowed the opportunity for a closer look
at the anchor and slab condition during the demolition phase.
Field measurements confirmed that helical anchor shafts were
1-½-inch square steel bars and that the pipe elements making
up the pier caps were 2 inch nominal diameter standard weight
steel pipes, as indicated on the Hubbell/Chance reference
drawing, Fig. 3. Cap plates, however, were found to be
connected to the pipe sleeves by welding rather than pinconnection.

Fig. 3. Anchor Cap Detail – Hubbell Power Systems.

However, this connection was field modified so that the asbuilt shaft-to-cap connection was welded using inconsistent
weld types and procedures, Fig. 4.

Installation
Construction installation logs indicate that the actual anchor
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Although the reference drawing called for pre-drilled holes in
the pipe sleeve and shaft, through which a bolt (pin) would be
inserted to connect the shaft to the pipe, an alternate
connection method was apparently used. It is likely this
change was made in the field to adjust for the random
variations that were likely encountered in the top-of-shaft
elevations. These elevations could be expected to have varied
greatly among individual anchor installations due to the
differences in helical shaft penetration depths.
Exposed steel rod tops were generally at their design
elevations indicating adequate embedment and sufficient uplift
capacity. Most of the helical shaft rods exposed during
demolition showed inelastic twist deformation of
approximately ¼ turn in the upper eight inches of exposed
shaft length. The observed permanent twist deformation very
likely occurred during installation at the maximum installation
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torque which was sufficient to produce inelastic torsion in the
shaft, Fig. 5.
Longitudinal cracks (i.e., cracks in the long direction of the
pool) were observed in the pool floor prior to its demolition.
Diagonal cracks radiated out from the corners of the pool slab
which intersected the cracks running longitudinally. Both
types of cracks were a result of the upward forces on the pool
floor as a consequence of the slab hold-down failure.

connection, a hypothetical failure hierarchy based on
component strengths was determined.
Although the
structurally weak link in the anchorage system was known in
advance from field observations of the failed anchor cap weld,
it is of interest to assess the other components of the
anchorage system.
Design strength analyses were consistent with relevant
sections of ACI 318 (American Concrete Institute, Building
Code Requirements for Structural Concrete) and AISC
(American Institute of Steel Construction) Manual and
Specifications.

Design Load of an Individual Anchor
The governing design load (critical load case for structural
design) acting on the helical anchors occurs when the pool is
empty and the groundwater table is at its highest. This
scenario results in a hydrostatic uplift pressure equal to the
groundwater pressure minus the dead load downward pressure
of the pool slab.

Fig. 3. Twisted Helical Anchor.

Close study of areas where the concrete slab was removed led
to the following observations related to the root cause of the
pool slab hold-down failure:
1.
2.

Embedded sleeve anchors did not show any sign of
pullout from concrete slab.
Slab hold-down failure appeared to have originated
with the welded connection between the embedded
pipe sleeve cap plate and the helical anchor shaft.
The weld connection failure was evident for most
helical anchor shafts exposed during demolition. It
was apparent that the failures occurred and
propagated along the weld lines.

STRUCTURAL ANALYSES
A satisfactory structural design requires that every element of
a structural system possess sufficient strength to safely resist
expected design forces. A structural system will fail when its
weakest element cannot adequately resist applied loads.
Structural analyses were performed to assess the design forces
and the strength of each component making up the anchor cap
connection between the helical anchors and the pool slab.
Component elements of both the as-designed and the as-built
field modified connections were investigated. Knowing the
relative strengths of the component elements of the
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The groundwater pressure is equal to the density of water
times the distance between the bottom of the pool slab and the
highest potential groundwater level. As noted earlier, the
static groundwater level, as given in the project geotechnical
report, was about 1.5 m (5 ft) below the existing grades.
Taking into consideration the seasonal fluctuation of up to 4
feet and building elevations, the bottom of the pool slab could
be 3.8 m (12.4 ft) below the highest potential groundwater
level corresponding to a groundwater pressure of about 775
psf. The dead load pressure of the slab, estimated as the
density of reinforced concrete (150 pcf) times the thickness of
the slab (1.5 ft), is 225 psf. For design purposes, the
groundwater pressure and dead load pressure are multiplied by
appropriate load factors, as specified by ASCE 7 (Minimum
Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures), to account
for deviations and uncertainties in determining the actual
loads.
The most unfavorable load combination, using
allowable stress design procedure (the design procedure
indicated on the design drawings), results from a load factor of
1.0 times the groundwater pressure (acting upward) and a load
factor of 0.6 times the dead load pressure (acting downward),
resulting in a net uplift pressure of 640 psf (1,037.5 psf using
load factors appropriate for strength design procedure). Given
that the tributary area of helical anchors used for the
swimming pool was 78.56 sq. ft. (9 ft by 8.73 ft), the
maximum required uplift resistance based on allowable stress
design is based on a service load of 50.3 kips (or 81.5 kips
using strength design), significantly larger than the service
load of 27 kips specified on the design drawings.

Failure Modes at the Anchor Cap Connection
There are eight primary failure modes associated with the
originally designed anchorage system connection. Each
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would need to be checked in order to ensure adequate strength
to resist uplift forces on the pin-connected helical pile anchor
caps. The eight failure modes are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Concrete breakout
Anchor pullout (from concrete slab)
Yielding of the gross section of the steel pipe
Rupture of the net section of the steel pipe
Shear rupture at the pin-connection
Shear rupture of the bolt
Bearing at the bolt hole
Weld between the cap plate and steel pipe

These eight failure modes were checked for resistance to the
specified tension design load of 27 kips as shown on the
drawings. In addition to these failure modes associated with
the anchor cap, our analysis indicates the anchor/soil pull-out
capacity is also insufficient, based on the design load as
calculated in previous section.
Concrete breakout and anchor pullout relate to failure within
the concrete slab. The strength of the anchor cap based on
these two failure modes can be reasonably assessed following
the guidelines in Appendix D (Anchoring to Concrete) of the
ACI 318 Building Code. The concrete breakout strength
could also arguably be assessed following the provisions of
Chapter 11.11 (Provisions for Slabs and Footings) of the ACI
318 Building Code. The anchor pullout strength was found to
be adequate and therefore not a concern. However, the
concrete breakout strength was found to be inadequate
compared to the specified service design tensile load of 27
kips, regardless of whether it is assessed using Appendix D or
Chapter 11.11 of the ACI 318 Building Code.

In the original anchor cap connection design by
Hubbell/Chance, a ¾-inch diameter ASTM A320, Grade L7
bolt was indicated, Fig. 3. The allowable shear strength of the
bolt was evaluated following Chapter J, Section J3.6, of the
AISC Specifications and found to be inadequate to resist the
specified design service load of 27 kips. It should be noted,
however, that because ASTM A320, Grade L7 bolts are not
covered in the AISC Specification the properties for an ASTM
A325 bolt were used for analysis. The ASTM A325 high
strength bolt has nearly the same minimum tensile strength as
an ASTM A320, Grade L7 bolt (120 ksi vs. 125 ksi) and
similar minimum yield strengths (92 ksi vs. 105 ksi).
The lowest allowable strength was found to be associated with
a bearing failure at the bolt hole. This failure mode was
evaluated using Chapter J, Section J7, of the AISC
Specifications and was found to be significantly less than the
specified service design load of 27 kips.
The weld strength connecting the steel pipe and ½-inch cap
plate was checked consistent with Chapter J, Section J2.4, of
the AISC Specifications. Since the exact details for the weld
size and type of electrode used were not specified, it was
assumed that a ⅛-inch fillet weld with E70 electrode was
used. This is in accordance with what would typically be
prescribed based on guidance from the AISC Specifications,
considering the pipe wall thickness of ⅛ in. Calculation
results indicated that the maximum service load permitted
based on allowable weld stresses was about half the specified
design service load of 27 kips.

Field Modified Weld Connection

The remaining six failure modes relate to failure within the
steel pile cap and their strength can be adequately assessed
following the guidelines of the AISC Steel Construction
Manual. Based on Hubbell/Chance literature for the pile cap
fabrication, Fig. 3, the steel pipe could be either ASTM A53
Grade B or ASTM A500 Grade B steel which have slightly
different material properties. For analysis purposes, ASTM
A53, Grade B steel was assumed.

Evidently, due to constructability issues related to variable
shaft cutoff elevations, the pre-drilled holes in helical anchor
shafts were not at the required theoretical design elevation.
This required the original pin-connected anchor cap design to
be abandoned for a welded connection. In the modified
connection, the square anchor shaft was inserted through a
hole cut in the ½ inch thick plate of the anchor cap and then
welded directly to it.

Design strengths for yielding of the gross section and rupture
of the net section of the steel pipe were evaluated following
Chapter D, Section D2, of the Thirteenth Edition AISC
Specification. Results indicated that the anchor cap pipe was
insufficient to resist the specified service design load of 27
kips.

This modification changed the load path such that the last six
failure modes discussed in previous section, are replaced by a
single potential failure mode governed by the strength of the
weld between anchor shaft and end plate. The weld strength
was evaluated following the guidelines of Chapter J, Section
J2.4, of the AISC Specification. Based on field observations
of this weld and consistent with recommendations from the
AISC Specification, the weld was assumed to be a 3/16 inch
fillet weld using an E70 electrode.

The design strength for shear rupture at the pin-connection
was evaluated in a manner consistent with Chapter D, Section
D5, of the AISC Specifications and was found to be adequate
to resist the specified service level design load of 27 kips, but
would not have been sufficient to resist the maximum design
load as calculated in the Design Load of an Individual Anchor
Section, above.
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When the weld is considered to be a fillet weld, the allowable
tensile force permitted was found to be approximately 62% of
the specified design service load of 27 kips and much less than
the maximum design service load calculated in Section Design
Load of an Individual Anchor above.
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A photograph of the actual cap assembly, Fig. 4, shows this
weld not to be a true fillet weld, but rather it resembles a
partial penetration butt weld. In any case, the photograph
shows that the weld quality was not consistent with a
quantifiable weld procedure and any strength calculations for
this weld are somewhat speculative. Allowable design values
calculated using the AISC Specifications are based on quality
welds made by certified welders. The welds observed in the
field were not consistent with good weld quality and therefore
could be expected to have strengths less than that calculated
by the AISC Specifications.

Consideration of Anchorage Failure Hierarchy
As discussed in previous sections, even if the anchor cap
connection had been constructed as originally designed, it still
would have been vulnerable to possible failure because it
possessed inadequate design strength for a variety of other
failure modes. A hierarchy of failure modes for the original
design based on calculations consistent with ACI 318 and
Thirteenth Edition AISC Specification procedures, listed in
ascending order starting with the mode possessing the least
resistance to tensile force is:

system showed a single pin connection linking helical anchor
shafts with the cap assembly needed to transfer uplift forces
between the pool’s bottom slab and helical anchors. This
connection was field modified to a welded connection,
presumably to correct a constructability issue resulting from
variable helical anchor shaft cutoff lengths, which made the
original pin-connection impossible. Pool slab uplift failure
was a direct result of the complete fracture and separation of
the weld used in the modified connections. However, there
were a number of other concerns and a potential failure
hierarchy revealed during analysis of other possible failure
modes associated with the anchor cap assembly. Structural
concerns were prevalent in both the original design as well as
in the modified design.
Uplift forces calculated for the original design were found to
be non-conservative, particularly when the groundwater table
fluctuation criteria reported in the project geotechnical report
are considered. Moreover, the service design load of 27 kips
indicated on the structural drawings was higher than the 20
kips capacity for the pile cap connection provided in the
Hubbell/Chance literature.
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It should be noted that the concrete breakout strength is based
on a 28-day concrete compressive strength of 4,000 psi though
it is anticipated that the actual concrete strength achieved was
higher. Furthermore, as mentioned in previous section the
weld quality between the anchor shaft and cap plate is of poor
quality and likely to exhibit less strength than predicted by the
AISC Specification calculations. These two factors offer an
explanation as to why calculations indicated that concrete
breakout could have occurred prior to weld failure in the asbuilt cap connection, contrary to the observed weld failure
mechanism.
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SUMMARY
The original design documents for the pool slab anchorage
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